Hungary after Orbán: what really changes with Magyar’s victory

Questo articolo fa parte della sperimentazione della versione in lingua inglese di Otto / This article is part of English-language beta version of Otto

The Hungarian elections held on 12 April marked the end of Viktor Orbán’s sixteen-year rule and the victory of Péter Magyar, who will lead the country with a strong two-thirds majority in Parliament. We discuss this topic with Anna Menyhert, professor of Hungarian Studies at the University of Turin and an internationally renowned expert in the field of trauma studies. With her Hungarian studies class, she has closely followed the election campaign over the last semester, analysing the speeches of Péter Magyar and Viktor Orbán from a rhetorical perspective and examining the symbolic references the two leaders draw upon to mobilise the collective imagination.

How should we interpret Péter Magyar’s victory? Could it be considered a real political turning point for Hungary?

Péter Magyar's victory is not only a change of government; it is a political event of exceptional magnitude in contemporary Hungarian history – a genuine regime change. After sixteen years of uninterrupted Orbán rule, widely perceived as structurally unassailable, this result breaks a system that seemed permanent. Almost 80% of citizens voted, unprecedented in Hungary, and Tisza secured two-thirds of parliamentary seats – enough to reverse much of Orbán's legislative legacy, including restoring EU compliance and introducing anti-corruption measures.

The term “political turning point” is justified, but must also be understood in a deeper societal sense. The Orbán system did not only transform institutions, law, or finances; it left deep scars on the social fabric. People were exposed to a state-controlled media environment in which misinformation and simplification became the norm. This produced not only political polarisation, but a distortion of reality for many Fidesz voters. Those who opposed the system faced political and economic marginalisation, often with existential consequences, leading many to leave the country. The psychological and cultural toll – social tension, isolation, apathy – will take time to process.

This outcome should not, however, be read as the sudden awakening of a previously passive society. Hungarian society has long contained persistent forms of resistance. Liberal, green, and civic actors have attempted for years to challenge the regime under highly unfavourable conditions. The TISZA movement reorganised this fragmented opposition and reconnected its energies through a radically new political language – a social media-based grassroots strategy capable of reaching far beyond established opposition milieus.

For years, Hungary under Orbán has been described as a “democrature”, i.e. an illiberal democracy. What were the defining features of this system, and how deeply has it reshaped Hungarian institutions and political culture?

The Orbán system can be described as a centrally organised political order in which formal democratic procedures coexisted with systematic concentration of power – illiberal in substance, democratic only as a façade. Its defining feature was controlled transformation: elections remained free, but the institutional environment was increasingly shaped to favour the governing party through legal means, such as redrawing electoral district boundaries.

At the institutional level, this meant the long-term reconfiguration of the state. Key positions in the judiciary, prosecution, regulatory bodies, and public administration were filled with politically loyal actors, often with extended mandates. The boundaries between public resources and party-political interests became blurred through state-directed economic networks and public procurement practices.

Equally important was the restructuring of the public sphere. A highly centralised media system emerged in which pro-government narratives dominated both public broadcasting and large segments of the private media market. Access to information became uneven, dependent on political alignment, geography, and generation. Many Fidesz voters – living in rural regions, with limited access to independent media – were influenced by propaganda narratives based on exclusion and fearmongering. Others believed in Fidesz ideology and economically benefited from the system.

The system also normalised a majoritarian, conflict-driven understanding of politics: governance framed as the assertion of a unified national will against internal and external adversaries – the “illegal migrant” or the allegedly hostile foreign power that would bring war to Hungary.

Over 16 years, institutional practices, professional norms, and everyday expectations adapted to this environment. Hungary, once a regional forerunner at EU accession in 2004, became economically weakened, corrupt, and socially exhausted.

To what extent can Hungary now “return” to a true liberal democracy? What are the main obstacles – legal, institutional, or cultural – that the new government will face?

Hungary is facing an enormous task and a historic opportunity at the same time: to restore order internally and externally, and to rebuild a country that is both liveable for its citizens and credible abroad. The previous system was politically entrenched and sparkled with megalomaniac grandiosity within the inner power circles, and, very significantly, it was also based on social exclusion and systemic abuse that left many citizens with no agency. The new government has the formal capacity to amend or replace the constitutional and legislative framework established under Orbán – a historically rare situation in which the tools used to entrench the previous system can now be used to dismantle it. The question is not whether change is legally possible, but how it is carried out and with what political discipline.

A central dimension is compliance with EU requirements. Restoring rule-of-law standards is not only a normative issue but a financial one: access to currently suspended EU funds will depend on credible reforms in judicial independence, anti-corruption mechanisms, and public procurement transparency – rebuilding the trust that was systematically eroded over sixteen years.

The main practical constraints are institutional. Key offices – prosecution, parts of the judiciary, regulatory authorities – remain staffed by figures appointed under the previous government, often with long mandates. Péter Magyar has publicly called on those in the highest roles to resign. A second obstacle lies in the economy and local administration, where governance became intertwined with networks of political loyalty. Dismantling these structures requires not only legal intervention but the re-establishment of neutral procedures – a slower process.

In his first press conference, Magyar outlined a dual strategy: rapid legal and anti-corruption measures combined with institutional normalisation. He committed to joining the European Public Prosecutor's Office, reviewing sensitive public procurement decisions, restoring transparency in state finances, and moving Hungary toward the eurozone. At the same time, in line with his new style of politics, he communicates these developments directly to Tisza communities via social media, maintaining a continuous and informal channel between government action and citizen engagement.

In higher education, the isolation of Hungarian universities should also soon end. The conversion of universities into foundation-run institutions with politically connected boards led the EU Commission to suspend Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe funding – a decision that, despite domestic compensation schemes which allowed Hungarian participation in these programmes, significantly damaged trust between Hungarian and European academic partners.

Péter Magyar comes from Orbán’s own party. To what extent does his victory represent a true break with that political system, beyond Hungary’s relationship with the European Union?

The fact that Péter Magyar emerges from within the former governing elite is central to understanding his success. He is a lawyer who worked for years in state-affiliated institutions during the Orbán period, was married to Minister of Justice Judit Varga, and comes from a family with deep roots in Hungarian public life – his great-uncle Ferenc Mádl served as President of Hungary. He knew the system from the inside, and voters felt that. Politically he sits on the right, but his style is notably dynamic.

He became publicly known in early 2024, during a political crisis following a controversial presidential pardon linked to a child abuse case that provoked widespread public outrage. The case led to the resignation of President Katalin Novák and of Judit Varga, Magyar's ex-wife. Magyar appeared in online media and in a live interview criticised leading figures of the Orbán government, exposing non-transparent internal practices and decision-making processes.

This background made him convincing: voters understood his personal motivation and trusted that he knew what he was doing. He built a new political platform from scratch, relying on social media, direct communication, and large-scale public appearances – bypassing both state-controlled media and the fragmented traditional opposition. The Tisza movement is informal, reactive, and highly personalised: a genuine grassroots phenomenon. 

At this stage, the break appears real in intention and direction, particularly in relation to rule of law, corruption prevention, and institutional, media and academic autonomy. For Tisza voters, his insider past was an asset; Fidesz voters, by contrast, see him as a traitor to their cause. Whether this break becomes durable will depend on how these intentions are translated into reliable structures.

Magyar won the election with a record turnout (over 78 per cent). How should we interpret this mobilisation, and what does it reveal about the social and political profile of Magyar’s electorate?

The turnout, at close to 80%, is unprecedented in Hungarian elections and indicates an extraordinary level of mobilisation. It suggests that voters perceived the election as decisive, with a clear sense that participation could produce a real political outcome. Many Hungarians living abroad travelled home to vote, sharing pictures of their journeys on social media – arriving from as far as South Africa and the US, and from neighbouring Austria and other European countries that host large Hungarian communities (the UK, Germany, the Netherlands).

The campaign was unusually innovative and efficient: Magyar and his team visited around 120 towns over two years, and as a gesture of solidarity he walked to Transylvania in 11 days to visit Hungarian minorities there. Magyar withstood a severe campaign of attacks from the Orbán government, targeting his personal life, with secret services also acting against the Tisza Party.

The mobilisation was broad and socially mixed. Higher participation was recorded not only in large cities but also in smaller towns and rural areas. The electorate was heterogeneous: former opposition voters, first-time voters, and a segment of previously government-aligned or undecided voters – united less by a common ideological position than by a shared desire to end the Orbán regime and rebuild a liveable country.

With roughly 3.3 million votes and around 136 out of 199 parliamentary seats, Tisza secured a two-thirds majority, while Fidesz fell to around 2.1 million votes and 55 seats. The electoral system designed under Orbán has now backfired: the same mechanisms that previously amplified Fidesz majorities have produced a supermajority for its opponent, turning the logic of the system against its original architects.